Securing Civil Protection Orders for Teens When Laws Ignore Teens by Martin, Lisa V.
University of South Carolina 
Scholar Commons 
Faculty Publications Law School 
3-2012 
Securing Civil Protection Orders for Teens When Laws Ignore 
Teens 
Lisa V. Martin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub 
 Part of the Family Law Commons 
Lisa Vollendorf Martin
Clinical Associate
Columbus Community Legal Services
Columbus School of Law
Catholic University of America




By Lisa Vollendorf MartinTeen dating violence is widespread today. Women are most likely to experience
abuse between the ages of 16 and 24.' Approximately one- out-of-every-three
teenagers report having been subjected to or threatened with physical or sex-
ual abuse in an intimate relationship.2 Of teens 6o percent know a teen who is being
abused by an intimate partner.3
Despite the pervasiveness of violence in teen relationships, civil protection- order
statutes-the primary source of civil legal protections from abuse for adults in the fifty
states and the District of Columbia-largely ignore teens.4 The accessibility of protec-
tion orders for teens depends primarily on the scope of their rights to standing and
legal capacity to pursue claims for protection.5 The concepts of standing and capacity
often are conflated in statutes and case law, but they involve two distinct inquiries.
Standing entails whether an individual has the right to seek legal relief as a party-at
all-under a particular cause of action, whereas legal capacity prescribes whether a
party has the right to represent the party's own interests in court proceedings.' Be-
cause states largely fail to detail expressly the circumstances under which teens are
accorded standing to seek protection orders and legal capacity to represent their own
interests in related court proceedings, the accessibility of protection orders for teens
in most states remains in flux.7
'See Callie Marie Rennison, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, Intimate Partner Violence and Age of Victim,
1993-99, at 1, 3 (Nov. 28, 2001), http://bit.ly/u4cY8H.
2 See TRU, Teen Dating Abuse Report 2009: Impact of the Economy and Parent/Teen Dialogue on Dating Relationships and
Abuse 12 (June 2009), http://bit.ly/tCDJNB.
3Id. at 13.
4See Stacy Brustin, Legal Responses to Teen Dating Violence, 29 FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY 331, 339 (1995); Roger J.R. Levesque,
Dating Violence, Adolescents, and the Law, 4 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF SOCIAL POLICY AND THE LAW 339, 342 (1997).
'For a detailed analysis of the accessibility of protection orders for teens across the fifty states and the District of Columbia,
see my What's Love Got to Do with It: Securing Access to Justice for Abused Teens, 61 CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
(forthcoming 2012).
6BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 235, 1536 (9th ed. 2009).
'See my What's Love Got to Do with It, supra note 5.
Clearinghouse REVIEW Journal of Poverty Law and Policy * March-April 2012464
Securing Civil Protection Orders for Teens When Laws Ignore Teens
Ambiguity Harmful to Teens
In theory the silence and the ambiguity
with regard to teens' rights to standing and
legal capacity in most protection- order
statutes are somewhat positive since they
prompt teens to argue that they are en-
titled to pursue the remedy on their own
terms-an option they would not have were
the statutory language expressly to deny
them relief. In practice, ambiguity oper-
ates to exclude teens from the protection-
order remedy and contributes to their vul-
nerabilityto continued abuse.
Ambiguity in protection- order statutes
harms teens because courts often are re-
luctant to proceed when confronted with
cases involving child parties. Courts' reti-
cence when presented with child parties is
a product of the law's treatment of children
generally. As a whole, the law says little
about children, and much of what it does
say about children is aimed at protecting
them in light of their immaturity and in-
experience.t A prime example is the law's
creation of minority status, a legal disabil-
ity imposed upon children to protect their
interests, which, among other results,
renders them incapable of entering into
many binding legal arrangements.9 The
protectionist instinct that informs much
of the law regarding children encourages
judges and clerks to proceed with caution
when presented with claims asserted by
children, including teens. Protectionist
instincts deny teens access to justice by
encouraging courts to conclude as a de-
fault position that teens lack standing and
legal capacity where the law is unclear.
The experience of the District of Co-
lumbia is illustrative. Before 2oo9, the
District's Intrafamily Offenses Act was
ambiguous regarding whether and under
what circumstances minors had standing
and capacity to seek protection orders.o
During this time teens who sought to file
petitions for protection orders without
an adult representative often were turned
away from the courthouse unless they had
counsel, based on the assumption that
teens were not entitled to seek relief on
their own." The recognition of the un-
evenness of access to justice afforded to
abused teens persuaded the D.C. Council
to amend the statute to articulate explic-
itly the scope of minor petitioners' rights
to standing and legal capacity. After the
amendments took effect in 2oo9, the
court's default response to minor peti-
tioners inverted: the court now assumes
that teens are entitled to seek protection
orders and routinely permits them to do
so independently.!
As the experience of the District of Co-
lumbia demonstrates, law reforms are
needed in most jurisdictions to guaran-
tee abused teens the same civil legal pro-
tections extended to adults." But how can
teens obtain protection in the interim?
In many jurisdictions, established legal
principles and policy arguments support
extending rights to standing and legal ca-
pacity to teens to seek protection orders
under statutes that remain unclear. Here
I introduce interim strategies that often
enabled teens represented by lawyers to
secure protection under D.C.'s formerly
ambiguous statute.
Arguments for the Extension of
Standing to Minors
To initiate any legal claim, a party must
demonstrate that the party has stand-
ing, the right to seek legal relief.4 Pro-
tection-order statutes often condition
'See DONALD T. KRAMER, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 1:5 (2d ed. 1994).
'BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 70 (9th ed. 2009).
"D.C. CODE §§ 16-1001(1), (5), 16-1003 (2001) (permitting "any person" to file petition).
"See Hearing on Bill 17-55, The "Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2007," Before the Committee on Public Safety and the
Judiciary Councilofthe District of Columbia 22-23 (2007) (statement of Karen Cunningham, Director of Legal Services for
Women Empowered Against Violence).
121nterview with Elisabeth Olds, Coexecutive Director of Survivors and Advocates for Empowerment, in Washington, D.C.
(Aug. 25, 2010).
"For a more detailed discussion of legislative reforms needed to make civil protection-order statutes effective in protecting
teens and proposed legislative language, see my What's Love Got to Do with It, supra note 5.
1
4
BLACK'5 LAw DICTIONARY 1536 (9th ed. 2009).
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standing on the relationship between the
parties and the nature of the conduct al-
leged to have been committed against the
petitioner. Protection- order statutes of-
ten fail to articulate whether and to what
extent standing is conditioned on age.15
Although such statutes may appear to ex-
tend standing equally to all individuals
regardless of age, they often are inter-
preted, in practice, to grant relief only to
adults. Nonetheless several established
legal principles and policy arguments
support extending standing to teens to
seek protection orders where there is no
evidence of a legislative intent to restrict
teens' access to this remedy.16
The Principle of Liberal Construction.
As remedial statutes, protection- order
statutes should be liberally construed to
benefit persons subjected to domestic vi-
olence.17 To advance this end, courts must
interpret ambiguities in protection- order
statutes to maximize the protections they
offer." Because protection-order stat-
utes cannot benefit abused teens if they
do not extend standing to minors, the
principle of liberal construction supports
interpreting ambiguous statutes to grant
standing to all individuals without regard
to age.
Presumption that Minors Have Rights.
As a general matter under state and fed-
eral law, teens enjoy the same individual
rights and means of legal redress to en-
force those rights as adults.'9 Although
states may impose greater restrictions on
minors' rights in the service of state inter-
ests, the law assumes, where they have not
clearly done so, that minors are accorded
the same rights as adults.-o By outlining
the procedures to be followed in cases in-
volving parties, such as minors, who lack
legal capacity, statutes and court rules in
nearly every state and the District of Co-
lumbia presume that minors are entitled
to pursue claims for legal relief in court."
Several states go further and explic-
itly preserve minors' rights to access the
courts in their constitutions or codes.-
In short, nearly all states contemplate
and several states explicitly guarantee that
minors may access the courts to vindi-
cate their legal rights. As a result, courts
should not read standing restrictions into
protection- order statutes that do not ex-
pressly limit access to the remedy by age.
Instilling Public Confidence in the Le-
gal System. Granting standing to minors
to seek protection orders advances states'
interests in instilling the public's confi-
"For a detailed analysis of standing provisions in protection-order statutes and their impact on teens, see my What's Love
Got to Do with It, supra note 5.
6The highest courts in at least two states have also determined that protection-order statutes extend standing to at least
some minors based simply on principles of statutory interpretation (see Hefel v Thompson, 577 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1998);
Beermann v Beermann, 559 N.W.2d 868 (S.D. 1997)).
"See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-101(b) (LexisNexis through 2011 Reg. Sess); Cruz-Foster v Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 929
(D.C. 1991); Pechovnik v Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 98-99 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); Frisk v Frisk, 719 N.W.2d 332, 335
(N.D. 2006); Raynes v Rogers, 955 A.2d 1135, 1140 (Vt. 2008).
"See Katharine B.T. v Jackson, 640 S.E.2d 569, 575-76 (W. Va. 2006) (interpreting state's protection-order statute to
extend standing to minors based in part on legislature's directive that courts should liberally construe its provisions).
"See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults,
are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."); Sorenson v Sorenson, 339 N.E.2d 907, 912 (Mass.
1975) ("Children enjoy the same right to protection and to legal redress for wrongs done them" as do adults.); see also
Petersen v Cityand CountyofHonolulu, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Haw. 1969); Wilbon v D.F BastCompany, 382 N.E.2d 784,
790-91 (111. 978); Norris v Mingle, 29 N.E.2d 400, 402 (Ind. 1940); Dunlap v Dunlap, 150 A. 905 (N.H. 1930); Gillette
v Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railway Company, 102 A. 673 (N.J. 1917); Henry v. City of New York, 724 N.E.2d
372, 374 (N.Y. 1999); Hunter v North Mason High School, 529 P.2d 898, 899 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Lee v Comer, 224
S.E.2d 721, 722-23 (W. Va. 1976).
2
0 Some examples of U.S. Supreme Court cases upholding state restrictions on minors' constitutional rights include New
Jersey v TL.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Bellotti v Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); McKeiver v Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971);
Ginsberg v New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
215ee Sara Jeruss, Empty Promises? How State Procedural Rules Block LGBT Minors from Vindicating Their Substantive
Rights, 43 UNIVERSITY OFSAN FRANCISCo LAW REVIEw 853, 872-73, 905-9 (2009); Alison M. Brumley, Comment, Parental Control
of a Minor's Right to Sue in Federal Court, 58 UNIVERSITY OFCHICAGO LAw REVIEw 333, 356 (1991).
"See Jeruss, supra note 21, at 905-9.
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dence in the legal system and reducing
intimate partner violence. Teens may be
reluctant to seek assistance from the le-
gal system in general because they view
it as intimidating, ineffective, racist, or
unsupportive., Their views may be re-
inforced if they are refused access to the
courts: "Denying a teen-aged litigant ac-
cess to our courts simply because he hap-
pens to be a minor ... tends to lessen the
confidence of young people in our legal
system."24 Solidifying the confidence of
abused teens in the legal system should
be particularly important to states. Teens
often do not disclose abuse to anyone, es-
pecially to adults. 5 Consequently a teen's
attempt to seek a protection order from
the legal system may present the first
opportunity for intervention in an abu-
sive teen relationship. If a teen is turned
away from the courthouse when the teen
comes forward to seek help, the teen may
be discouraged from further disclosure
and remain at risk of further violence.
For all of these reasons, extending stand-
ing to teens to seek protection orders
promotes the public welfare by instilling
confidence in the legal system and pro-
viding opportunities for intervention in
abusive teen relationships.
Legal Capacity
The accessibility of the protection or-
der remedy to teens depends not only
on whether teens have standing to pur-
sue the remedy at all but also on whether
they have the legal capacity to represent
themselves in related court proceedings.
Minors generally lack the capacity to take
civil legal action."' Courts often appoint
a parent, guardian, or other adult to rep-
resent a minor party's interests in litiga-
tion.27 Perhaps because minors so rarely
appear before courts as parties without
adult representatives, courts often as-
sume that they are prohibited from ad-
judicating claims brought by minors who
desire to represent their own interests.
Although some states mandate the ap-
pointment of adults to represent the in-
terests of minor parties in all legal pro-
ceedings, many states take a much more
flexible approach.2a
With the exception of a few progressive
jurisdictions, protection- order statutes
largely fail to deal with the extent to which
teens have the legal capacity to pursue
protection-order claims.29 At the same
time some of these same jurisdictions im-
pose additional impediments to relief not
faced by adults. For example, provisions
in California, the District of Columbia,
and Tennessee require courts to assess
whether a teen's parent should be notified
of protection- order proceedings initi-
ated by the teen without parental involve-
ment." These provisions direct courts to
evaluate whether permitting a teen to seek
a protection order without parental in-
volvement serves a teen's best interests;
yet none guides courts on how to make
such determinations.' All of these ambi-
2Focus Group by Women Empowered Against Violence with Teens, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 2005 & Jan. 2006) (in my
files).
24Buckholz v Leveille, 194 N.W.2d 427, 427 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
25Amy Karan & Lisa Keating, Obsessive Teenage Love: The Precursor to Domestic Violence, 46 JUDGES' JOURNAL, Summer
2007, at 23, 24; see also my What's Love Got to Do with It, supra note 5, for a detailed discussion of why teens rarely
disclose abuse.
262 THOMAs . JACOBS, CHILDREN A D THE LAw: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATONS § 11:13 (2011).
274 JAMES WILLIAM OORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 17.21[3][a] (3d ed. 2011).
28See Jeruss, supra note 21; see also my What's Love Got to Do with It, supra note 5, for a detailed analysis of the
treatment of legal capacity in protection-order statutes in the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
295ee, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. ODE § 372(b)(1)(C-(D) (West 2004) (according minors 12 and older legal capacity to appear in
court without adult representative); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6301(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); D.C. CODE § 16-1003(a)(2) (2011)
(permitting minors over 12 to seek protection orders without adult representative); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3(ll)(b) (2010)
("A minor plaintiff need not be accompanied by a parent or guardian to receive relief .... "); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.020(2)
(a) (2011) (indicating that minors who are at least 16 do not need guardian or next friend to pursue order for protection).
"oSee CAL. Civ. PROC. ODE §372(b)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); D.C. CODE § 16-1004(e) (Supp. 2011); see also TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-602(b) (2010).
3 See sources cited supra note 30.
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guities heighten the challenges involved
in counseling teens on the likely con-
sequences of pursuing the protection-
order remedy since it leaves advocates
unable to predict with certainty whether
a teen's parents will be notified of or re-
quired to be involved in the proceedings.
Arguments for Extending Legal
Capacity to Minors and Overriding
Parent Notification Mandates
Statutes that require teens to pursue
claims for protection orders through adult
representatives or require courts to notify
parents if teens initiate protection- order
claims independently deter teens from
seeking legal relief because teens are of-
ten unwilling to disclose abuse to adults 1
Several legal principles and policy argu-
ments support courts extending legal ca-
pacity to teens to represent themselves in
protection- order proceedings where state
laws do not mandate the involvement of
an adult representative.
Liberal Construction Revisited and
Applied to Capacity. As in the context
of standing, the principle of liberal con-
struction supports interpreting ambigu-
ous protection-order statutes to confer
capacity on teen petitioners to repre-
sent themselves in court proceedings."
Protection-order statutes best protect
teens subjected to abuse if such statutes
accord teens legal capacity because teens
are more likely to seek protection orders
if they are not required to involve their
parents in related proceedings.34
Enabling Minors to Protect Their
Health, Safety, and Welfare. Granting
minors the legal capacity to represent
themselves in protection-order pro-
ceedings is consistent with state policies
that authorize minors to make autono-
mous decisions about matters affecting
their health, well-being, and safety in
other contexts. "Mature minor" statutes
in many states permit minors to con-
sent, without parent involvement or no-
tification, to emergency and outpatient
medical care, testing and treatment for
sexually transmitted diseases, substance
abuse treatment, outpatient mental
health services, and reproductive health
care.'5 States have also accorded minors
the legal capacity to make decisions about
the health, well-being, and safety of their
own children without adult involvement.
To this end, minors have been granted the
right to consent to the adoption of a child,
pursue legal claims for child support and
custody, and apply for government ben-
efits such as Medicaid and Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families." By enact-
ing these policies, states have prioritized
encouraging minors to avail themselves of
services crucial to their health, safety, and
well-being over preserving parent control
over adolescent decision making.
Courts' Discretion to Permit Minors
to Represent Themselves: Rule 17(c).
Statutes and court rules governing legal
capacity in more than half of states grant
courts the discretion to permit a mi-
nor party to pursue legal claims without
an adult representative. A Twenty-four
325ee Kristine Herman, Center for Court Innovation, Youth Dating Violence: Can a Court Help Break the Cycle? 5 (2004);
see also Karan & Keating, supra note 25; see my What's Love Got to Do with It, supra note 5.
335ee note 17, supra, and accompanying text.
34But see Katherine B. T, 640 S.E.2d at 577 (declining to conclude that principle of liberal construction supports interpreting
state's rules regarding legal capacity, including rule derived from Federal Rule 17(c), to permit minors to proceed without
adult representatives in protection-order cases).
"See Heather Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, Minors and the Right to Consent to Health Care, GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC
POLICY, Aug. 2000, at 4-5.
"See D.C. CODE § 16-914(a-3) (granting minor parents right to initiate custody proceedings); KRAMER, supra note 8, § 14:2;
Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: Minors' Rights as Parents (Jan. 1, 2012), http://bit.ly/AEMWgd; Guttmacher
Institute, State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Minors' Consent Law (Jan. 1, 2012), http://bit.ly/zHqg4t; Jodie Levin-
Epstein & John Hutchins, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Teens and TANF: How Adolescents Fare Under the Nation's
Welfare Program (Dec. 2003), http://bit.ly/yaLUIF.
"See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 45a-132(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:41 (LexisNexis 2007);
and authorities cited infra note 38.
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states incorporate nearly verbatim the
procedures applied in cases involving
minor parties found in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 17 (c)." Rule 17(c) au-
thorizes adults who share one of several
types of relationships with minors to sue
on behalf of minor parties and directs
that courts "must appoint a guardian ad
litem-or issue another appropriate or-
der-to protect a minor ... who is unrep-
resented in an action."'9 Although Rule
17(c) is often characterized as mandating
the appointment of adult representatives
for minor parties, courts repeatedly have
interpreted Rule 17(c) to afford judges
the discretion to proceed without the ap-
pointment of a representative so long as
the minor's interests are adequately pro-
tected. 40
The "Bellotti" Test as a Model for Eval-
uating Minors' Interests. Although the
jurisprudence analyzing Rule 17(c) does
not concern how courts should evalu-
ate whether a minor party's interests
are adequately protected without an
adult representative, the jurisprudence
on whether pregnant minors should be
permitted to bypass parent notification
requirements of state abortion stat-
utes is a useful model.4' As articulated
in Bellotti v. Baird, courts must exempt
pregnant minors from parent notifica-
tion requirements if such minors dem-
onstrate maturity or if that bypass serves
their best interests.4 2 Likewise, courts
should conclude that minor petition-
ers' interests are adequately protected
in protection-order cases where minor
petitioners demonstrate maturity or that
representing themselves serves their
best interests.
Evaluating Maturity. In many cases a mi-
nor petitioner's autonomous decision to
seek a civil protection order, itself, will
demonstrate the minor's good judgment
and maturity.43 Minors might also dem-
onstrate their maturity through their de-
meanor, including their analytic ability,
thoughtfulness, and ability to articulate
their reasons for seeking court protec-
tion; life experience, including their
educational background, management of
personal finances, experience with living
away from home, and employment; per-
spective, including their ability to un-
derstand and weigh the consequences of
the options available to them; and judg-
ment. 44
Weighing Minors' Best Interests. Minors'
interest in safety should be paramount
when a court weighs whether permitting
minor petitioners to represent them-
selves in protection-order proceedings
serves their best interests. 45 As the Su-
preme Court of South Dakota reflected
when assessing whether to appoint an
adult representative for a minor peti-
tioner in protection-order proceedings,
'See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-17(c) (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-217(c) (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2017(c) (West 2010);
S.D. CoDI LAws § 15-6-17(c) (2011); ALA. R. Civ. P. 17(c); AASKA R. Civ. P. 17(c); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 17(g); CoLo. R. CIv. P. 17(c);
DEL. SUPER. CT. R.Civ. P. 17(c); FLA. R. Cry. P 1.210(b); HAW. R. Civ. P. 17(c); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 17(c); ME. R. Cw. P. 17(b); MASS. R.
Civ. P. 17(b); Miss. R. Cv. P. 17(c); MoNT. R. Civ. P. 17(c); NEv. R. Civ. P. 17(c); N.M. DIST. CT. R. Civ. P. 1-017(c); N.D. R. Civ.
P. 17(b); OHio R. CIv. P. 17(B); S.C. R. Cv. P. 17(c); TENN. CT. R. ANN. 17.03; Vr. R. Civ. P 17(b); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 17(c); see also
Jeruss, supra note 21, at 875-78, 905-10.
"FED. R. Civ. P. 17(cX2).
40See, e.g., Gardner v Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 1989); M.S. v Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 174 (8th Cir. 1977);
Roberts v Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 256 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958).
41The few cases on this issue hold that a minor party's interests were adequately protected without an appointed guardian
because another adult accompanied the minor to court proceedings (see, e.g., Cowden v Ramsay (In re Cowden), 154
B.R. 531, 535 (Bankr. D. Ark. 1993)). See also Brumley, supra note 21, at 348-55, for a related argument that courts
should apply the Bellotti test to determine whether a minor should have a right to sue over parental objection on an issue
normally reserved to parental discretion.
4Belotti v Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979).
43See In re Anonymous, 782 So. 2d 791, 793 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).
44See, e.g., H.B. v Wilkinson, 639 F. Supp. 952, 954 (D. Utah 1986); Ex Parte Anonymous, 806 So. 2d 1269, 1274 (Ala.
2001); In re Anonymous, 782 So. 2d at 792; In re B.S., 74 P.3d 285, 290-91 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); In re Doe, 973 So. 2d
548, 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 256 (Tex. 2000).
4S5ee, e.g., In re Doe 2, 166 P.3d 293, 296 (Colo. App. 2007); In re Doe, 866 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); In re
Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. 2000).
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"[wle are not convinced that the need for
a guardian at the petition stage outweighs
the need for immediate court protec-
tion.... In the middle of domestic strife,
preserving the mental and emotional
health of the vulnerable must override
other less compelling interests."46 Par-
ticularly if minor petitioners choose not
to seek a protection order if a parent or
another adult must participate in the liti-
gation, permitting minor petitioners to
represent themselves nearly always ad-
vances their interests in safety. Courts
weighing a minor petitioner's best in-
terests also might consider the extent
to which requiring adult representation
could disrupt the minor petitioner's
home life.4 7
"Bellotti" and Parent Notification.
The Bellotti jurisprudence also is a use-
ful framework for courts in states that
grant legal capacity to minors but require
courts to decide whether to notify par-
ents that their minor children have initi-
ated protection- order proceedings.4t In
California and the District of Columbia,
for example, minors aged 12 and older
have the capacity to represent themselves
in protection- order proceedings under
certain circumstances, but when minors
initiate such cases, courts must notify a
parent unless the court determines that
notification would impair the minor
petitioner's best interests.49 Just as with
assessments of whether minor petition-
ers' interests are adequately protected if
they represent themselves, court deter-
minations of whether parent notification
will harm a minor petitioner's interests
should focus principally on safety.o Jf
notifying a parent risks causing a minor
petitioner to abandon a claim for a pro-
tection order, forgoing parent notifica-
tion will nearly always advance the mi-
nor's interest in safety.
Advocacy Road Map
The legal protections available under
civil protection- order statutes are as
critical to abused teens as they are to
adults.1 Yet the widespread ambiguities
in protection- order statutes with regard
to teens' rights to standing and legal ca-
pacity often prevent teens from access-
ing this remedy. I have offered strategies
that advocates have successfully pursued
to secure protection orders for teens un-
der ambiguous statutes. Because the ef-
fectiveness of the arguments suggested
varies with jurisdiction, advocates as-
sisting teens in seeking civil protection
orders under ambiguous statutes might
consider the following questions about
the laws in their jurisdictions to imple-
ment the strategies proposed above:
Standing
* Does the protection-order statute refer
to age when defining who is eligible to
seek a protection order?
* Does the protection- order statute ex-
plicitly limit protection orders to adults
or minors over a certain age?
* Is there case law or legislative history
recognizing the protection- order stat-
ute as remedial or emphasizing the
principle of liberal construction?
* Is there case law recognizing that minors
enjoy legal rights, just as adults?
* Is the right to access the courts to seek
legal relief guaranteed to minors by
constitutional provision, statute, or case
law?
" Does the jurisdiction have a statute or
court rule designating the procedures to
be implemented in cases involving par-
46Beermann, 559 N.W.2d at 871 (internal citations omitted).
47See sources cited supra note 45.
'For a detailed analysis of parent notification provisions in protection-order statutes, see my What's Love Got to Do with
It, supra note 5.
49CAL. Civ. PROC. ODE § 372 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6301 (West, Westlaw through
2011 Reg. Sess.); D.C. CODE §§ 16-1003(a), 1004(e) (Supp. 2011).
"oSee supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
"See my What's Love Got to Do with It, supra note 5, for a detailed discussion of the benefits of the protection-order
remedy to teens.
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ties lacking legal capacity (thereby im-
plying that they have standing)?
E Is there case law recognizing the state's
interests in instilling public confi-
dence in the legal system?
Legal Capacity
a Does the protection-order statute ar-
ticulate the procedures to be followed
when a minor petitioner seeks a pro-
tection order?
m Does the protection-order statute spe-
cifically articulate whether a minor pe-
titioner is authorized to file a petition
for a protection order or participate in
related court proceedings without an
adult representative?
m Is there case law or legislative history
recognizing the protection- order stat-
ute as remedial or emphasizing the
principle of liberal construction?
m Are there statutes or regulations grant-
ing minors the right to consent without
parent involvement to matters affect-
ing their health, safety, or welfare, such
as emergency medical care, testing or
treatment for sexually transmitted dis-
eases, or reproductive health care?
m Does the statute or court rule on legal
capacity in civil matters follow Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)? That is,
does the statute or rule permit courts
to appoint an adult representative for a
minor party or issue another appropri-
ate order?
" If the jurisdiction grants courts the
discretion to determine whether to ap-
point an adult representative for minor
parties, what factors demonstrate that
minors are sufficiently mature to repre-
sent their own interests in the litigation,
or that permitting minors to represent
themselves serves their best interests
regardless of their maturity level?
Clearinghouse REVIEW Journal of Poverty Law and Policy m March-April 2012 471
